AMERICANDIVIDENDFUND EST·MMXXVI American Dividend Fund Est. July 4, 2026 · A nonpartisan policy laboratory

Proposal № 119 of 250  ·  Released October 30, 2026

The Diaspora Bond

Israel has raised more than $53 billion from its diaspora in bonds since 1951. India raised $4.2 billion in a single issue in 1998, under sanctions, in weeks. Sub-Saharan Africa, whose diaspora sends home about $54 billion a year in remittances, has raised almost nothing this way, because the bonds that were tried were unregistered, unguaranteed and unconvincing. Build the platform: a standard registration, sale through the Postal Bank in $100 notes, a partial American guarantee for partners meeting the Compact's conditions, and every dollar tied to a named project the buyer can visit.

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The problem

A diaspora bond is the simplest instrument in development finance: a government borrows from the people who left it, who know the country, trust it more than the market does, and will accept a lower rate to build something at home. Israel has sold bonds to its diaspora since 1951 and has raised more than $53 billion, through wars and recessions, at rates below what the market would charge, and has never missed a payment. India, cut off from international markets by sanctions after its 1998 nuclear tests, raised $4.2 billion from its diaspora in a few weeks through the Resurgent India Bonds, and has done it twice more. The World Bank estimates that the savings of developing-country diasporas run to about $400 billion a year, and that sub-Saharan African governments alone could raise $5 to $10 billion a year from theirs, if they could reach them.

They have tried and mostly failed. Ethiopia's 2011 bond for a dam raised a fraction of its target; Kenya's the same year was undersubscribed; Nigeria's 2017 issue raised $300 million, which was a success and a rounding error against the need. The failures share causes: the bonds were not registered with the securities regulators of the countries where the diaspora lives, so they could not be sold legally to most buyers; they carried no guarantee, so the buyer bore the full political risk of a country whose politics they had often fled; they were sold through embassies rather than through the banks and apps people actually use; and the proceeds went to a general budget rather than to something the buyer could see.

Meanwhile the diaspora sends money home anyway. Remittances to sub-Saharan Africa run about $54 billion a year, mostly in small transfers at fees of 8 percent or more, mostly to households, none of it building a grid. The people are willing. The instrument was never built.

№ 116 gave Compact governments a guarantee to refinance their debt. № 091 gave every American a bank counter. This proposal connects them.

The proposal

The Diaspora Bond: a standard registration under American securities law for bonds issued by Marshall Compact governments to fund named projects, sold in denominations of $100 through the Postal Bank of № 091 and any broker, to any American or resident, with a partial American guarantee under the facility of № 116 for issuers meeting its conditions. Proceeds are held in escrow and released against verified progress on the named project. The Fund may hold the bonds at market weight.

How it would work

  1. The registration. The Securities and Exchange Commission adopts a standard shelf registration for Compact sovereign issuers, so that a bond can be lawfully offered to the American public without a bespoke process each time. The failure of most diaspora bonds began here: an unregistered bond cannot be sold to most of the people it was meant for.
  1. The counter. Bonds are sold in $100 denominations through the Postal Bank, through any brokerage, and through the phone apps that carry remittances today, so that a nurse in Houston who sends $300 a month to Lagos can put $100 of it into a bond that builds the grid her mother's neighbourhood is waiting for. The bond is open to any buyer; there is no ethnic test, because a good bond needs none.
  1. The guarantee. For issuers meeting the conditions of № 116, the published fiscal framework, the audited debt, the committed use of proceeds, the United States guarantees a share of the principal, on the order of half, so that the buyer's risk is that of a partly guaranteed sovereign rather than a frontier one. The guarantee is scored at its expected cost, which for issuers meeting the conditions is low.
  1. The project. Every bond names its project: a transmission line under № 111, a landing station under № 112, a seed programme under № 118, a hospital. Proceeds sit in escrow and are released against verified construction milestones, published. A buyer can look up what their $100 built, and, on a visit home, drive past it.
  1. The rate. Set by the market at issue, which for a half-guaranteed bond from a compliant issuer will be well below the 8 to 10 percent the same government pays today. The difference is the diaspora's gift to the country and the guarantee's gift to the diaspora, and both are visible.
  1. The Fund. The bonds are sovereign bonds and the Fund may hold them at market weight under the Index Rule, as it holds any. A guaranteed bond in the Fund's portfolio is a safe asset paying a frontier-adjacent yield, and the Fund's presence in the market is a floor under the price.
  1. No tax gift. The bonds are taxed as any bond is. A tax exemption would be a subsidy from all Americans to the buyers of a particular country's debt, and the catalog does not hide subsidies inside tax code. The guarantee is the subsidy, and it is scored.

The numbers

The potential. $5 to $10 billion a year for sub-Saharan Africa by the World Bank's estimate; the American diaspora's share of that is a large fraction, given that the United States hosts the largest African immigrant population outside the continent and sends the largest share of remittances.

The precedent. Israel's $53 billion over 74 years; India's $4.2 billion in weeks. The African diaspora in the United States is several times the size of either country's, and its remittances are proof of its willingness.

The cost. The guarantee's expected loss on issuers meeting the Compact's conditions, a few percent of the guaranteed share, on the order of $100 to $200 million a year at full scale, scored up front. The registration and the counter cost the regulators and the Postal Bank a small fee, recovered from issuers.

The saving. A government borrowing $1 billion at 5 percent rather than 9 saves $40 million a year, for the life of the bond, on a project its own citizens abroad chose to fund.

The honest objections

"Diaspora bonds have failed almost everywhere they were tried outside Israel and India." They failed for the reasons items 1 through 4 correct: no registration, no guarantee, no counter, no project. Israel's and India's bonds had all four, in their own forms, and succeeded. The proposal is the failed bonds' post-mortem, applied.

"A guarantee is a subsidy to foreign governments' borrowing." It is, and it is scored, published and conditional, which is more than can be said for the subsidies buried in the current arrangement, in which remittance fees of 8 percent are paid by the poor to the transfer companies and the bond market charges 9 percent to governments whose diasporas would lend at 5. The subsidy is the price of the instrument working, and it is small.

"Governments will spend the money on something else." The escrow in item 4 releases proceeds against verified milestones on the named project, and a government that diverts them has defaulted on the bond's terms, triggers the guarantee, and loses the Compact's benefits under № 116. The buyer's $100 goes to the transmission line or it goes back to the buyer.

"Restricting sales to a diaspora is discriminatory; opening them to everyone is not a diaspora bond." It is open to everyone, and it will be bought mostly by the diaspora, because they are the buyers who know the country and want the project. Israel Bonds are sold to anyone; most buyers are Jewish. The name describes the market, not a legal test.

"The Fund holding African sovereign bonds is the political investing № 065 forbade." The Fund holds them at market weight, under the Index Rule, as it holds every sovereign bond in the global index, and the guarantee makes them safer than most. Holding a bond the government has guaranteed is not picking a stock; it is owning the world, which now includes this.

Sources

  • World Bank, Development Finance via Diaspora Bonds: Track Record and Potential (Ketkar and Ratha, Policy Research Working Paper 4311), and Migration and Development Brief, remittance flows to sub-Saharan Africa
  • Development Corporation for Israel, cumulative Israel Bonds sales since 1951; Reserve Bank of India, on the Resurgent India Bonds (1998) and India Millennium Deposits (2000)
  • Migration Policy Institute, Can Diaspora Bonds Supercharge Development Investment?; Brookings Institution, Diaspora bonds: An innovative source of financing?
  • Debt Management Office of Nigeria, 2017 diaspora bond issuance
  • Proposals № 001 (The American Dividend); № 065 (The Index Rule); № 091 (The Postal Bank); № 111 (The Six Hundred Million); № 112 (The Subsea Compact); № 116 (The Refinancing Hand); № 118 (The Seed Compact)